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COMMENTS
DEDUCTIBILITY OF TREBLE DAMAGE PAYMENTS AS AN
ORDINARY AND NECESSARY BUSINESS EXPENSE-THE
FUTURE OF REVENUE RULING 64-224
I. INTRODUCTION
The United States Government, in 1960, obtained indictments and convictions
against 29 manufacturersI of electrical equipment for conspiring to fix prices in
violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act.2 Fines of nearly $2,000,000 were im-
posed on the violators, 3 and more than 1800 civil suits4 were brought for damages
under sections 45 and 4A6 of the Clayton Act. It has been estimated that these
private damage suits will end in settlements totaling nearly $300,000,000. 7 On
July 24, 1964, the Internal Revenue Service promulgated Revenue Ruling 64-
224,8 which stated that amounts paid in satisfaction of treble damage claims
under sections 4 and 4A of the Clayton Act were deductible to the violating tax-
payer as ordinary and necessary business expenses under section 162 (a) of the
Internal Revenue Code.9 However, the payments made to the Government under
section 4A were ruled non-deductible.' 0
Congressional reaction to this newly stated position"1 of the IRS was largely
unfavorable. In the House of Representatives, Congressman Emanuel Celler,
1. Most of the companies pleaded guilty or entered pleas of nolo contendere. See Staff
of the Joint Comm. on Internal Revenue Taxation, 89th Cong., 1st Sess., Study of Income
Tax Treatment of Treble Damage Payments Under the Antitrust Laws 2 (1965) [herein-
after cited as Staff Study].
2. 26 Stat. 209 (1890), 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1964).
3. Staff Study 2. The fines ranged from a high of $437,500 down to $7r500. Ibid.
4. Ibid. As late as September 1965, 750 cases were still pending. See 1965 Reports of
the Proceedings of the Judicial Conference of the United States 119.
5. 38 Stat. 731 (1914), as amended, 15 US.C. § 15 (1964).
6. 69 Stat. 282 (1955), 15 U.S.C. § 15a (1964).
7. Staff Study 2. General Electric alone paid over $190,000,000 in settlements. Ibid.
See 112 Cong. Rec. 16183 (daily ed. July 25, 1966) (remarks of Senator Long).
8. 1964-2 Cum. Bull. 52.
9. Int. Rev. Code of 1954, § 162(a) states in part: "There shall be allowed as a deduc-
tion all the ordinary and necessary expenses paid or incurred during the ta.able year in
carrying on any trade or business .... "
10. Rev. Rul. 64-224, 1964-2 Cum. Bull. 52. Under § 4A, the Government may only
collect actual not treble damages. 69 Stat. 282, 15 U.S.C. § 15a (1964).
11. Rev. Rul. 64-224 is the first official stand that the IRS has taken on the issue of
deductibility of treble damage payments. In 1956, in an unpublished memorandum, the
IRS took a similar position when it allowed the Columbia Pictures Corporation to deduct
its treble damage payments. It based its holding on the fact that the payments involved
were private, made to private persons to redress private injury, as opposed to payments
made to the Government as compensation for an injury to the public. See Staff Study 27.
However, in 1960, the unofficial position of the IRS was unfavorable toward the deduction.
See text accompanying notes 83-84 infra.
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chairman of the House Committee on the Judiciary, commented that the ruling
was
bad law, bad public policy, and bad public administration [since it permitted] . . .
an antitrust offender, already convicted of a criminal antitrust violation, to deduct
treble damages paid to its victims after guilt has already been established, and conse-
quent damages to the victims proved in a private action.1 2
Senator Philip Hart of Michigan, chairman of the Senate Antitrust and Monop-
oly Subcommitte, referred to the ruling as a "gift worth at least $150 million"
to the electrical manufacturers convicted of price fixing conspiracies.18 Both
legislators sponsored bills to combat the effects of the IRS ruling.1 4 To facilitate
the Congressional study of the IRS ruling, the Staff of the Joint Committee on
Internal Revenue Taxation' 5 sought the views of the Senate and House Antitrust
Subcommittees and those of the Internal Revenue Service, as well as the views
of interested parties in industry. The results were published in a report released
on November 1, 1965, in which suggestions were presented for possible legislative
action.'0 These suggestions were adopted by Senator Russell Long of Louisiana
in his proposed bill to amend the Internal Revenue Code.17
II. THE PENAL-REMEDIAL DICHOTOMY
Although section 162 (a) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 allows the
deduction of ordinary and necessary business expenses from the taxpayer's gross
income, the Supreme Court has held that there cannot be a finding of "necessity"
where the "allowance of the deduction would frustrate sharply defined national
or state policies proscribing particular types of conduct, evidenced by some gov-
ernmental declaration thereof."' 8 The IRS, in issuing Revenue Ruling 64-224,
stated that where the statute which is violated is "intended to punish the wrong-
doers," a deduction in such case should be disallowed, since the intended punish-
ment would be "mitigated by the allowance of an income tax deduction." 1
However, the IRS distinguished the payment of treble damages from the afore-
mentioned category, stating that "if the purpose behind a statute compelling
a wrongdoer to make payments is remedial in nature and is intended to provide
a formula for the reparation of a private injury, such payments, if otherwise
12. 111 Cong. Rec. 1172 (1965).
13. 111 Cong. Rec. 22198 (1965).
14. H.R. 12319, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966); S. 2479, 89th Cong., 1st Sess. (1965).
Congressman Celler has reintroduced his bill in the 90th Congress. See H.R. 2514, 90th
Cong., 1st Sess. (1967). Representative Celler and Senator Hart also issued a joint state-
ment condemning the IRS ruling. Staff Study 44; Lamont, Controversial Aspects of Or-
dinary and Necessary Business Expense, 42 Taxes 808, 830 (1964).
15. The Joint Committee on Internal Revenue Taxation was chaired by Senator Harry
F. Byrd, with Representative Wilber D. Mills as vice-chairman. Staff Study 1.
16. Staff Study 16-17.
17. S. 3650, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966). See notes 119-130 infra and accompanying text.
18. Tank Truck Rentals, Inc. v. Commissioner, 356 U.S. 30, 33-34 (1958). (Citations
omitted.)
19. Rev. Rul. 64-224, 1964-2 Cum. Bull. 52, 53.
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proper, constitute allowable deductions from gross income."2- The nature of the
treble damage section under section 4 of the Clayton Act was further deter-
mined by the IRS to be remedial rather than penal.21
There is ample authority for placing section 4 treble damages on either side
of the penal-remedial dichotomy. 22 Congress, the courts and legal publications
have all seen fit to take positions reflecting support for each side. The available
legislative history surrounding the enactment of section 7 of the Sherman Actas
appears to be inconclusive. 24 A statement by Senator Sherman that "damages
should be commensurate with the difficulty of maintaining a private suit against
a combination"2 5 is one indication that the treble damage provision was enacted
to encourage the bringing of private suits by those damaged by violations of the
antitrust laws. However, a strong statement to the effect that the multiple dam-
age provision was intended as a punitive measure was made by Senator Hoar of
Massachusetts26 during the Congressional debates on the Act, when he com-
mented that "this section ... is a section establishing a penalty, threefold dam-
ages.";
2 7
Recent legislative history is, perhaps, more persuasive.2 In 1955, the Clayton
20. Ibid.
21. Id. at 54. Although the Government is suing in its proprietary capacity when it
brings a § 4A suit, see S. Rep. No. 619, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1955), the IRS nonetheless
treated the § 4A payments differently than those payments made under § 4, on the theory
that damages paid to the Government under § 4A amounted to reparation for a wrong
committed against the public. However, it is not certain whether any prevailing policies
necessitate such treatment. See note 36 infra and accompanying text.
22. See authorities cited in Staff Study 2-6; Noall & Troxell, Tax Aspects of Antitrust
Proceedings, 18 Tax L. Rev. 213, 233-37 (1963).
23. Section 4 of the Clayton Act was merely intended as a supplement "to the existing
laws, and extends the remedy under section 7 of the Sherman Act to persons injured in
their business or property by the wrongful acts of persons or combinations violating any
of the antitrust laws, and allows the recovery of threefold damages therefor." H.R. Rep. No.
627, 63d Cong., 2d Sess. 14 (1914). It would appear, therefore, that whatever legislative
history accompanied § 7 of the Sherman Act, Act of July 2, 1890, ch. 647, § 7, 26 Stat.
210, is still relevant, although that section has since been repealed. Act of July 7, 1955, ch.
283, § 3, 69 Stat. 283.
24. See Staff Study 3.
25. 21 Cong. Rec. 2456 (1890).
26. Senator Hoar was in charge of the bill, and has been recognized by at least one
authority as "in large measure the author of the same in its final form . . . ." Haskell v.
Perkins, 28 F.2d 222, 223 (D.N.J. 1928), rev'd on other grounds, 31 F.2d 53 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 279 U.S. 872 (1929).
27. 21 Cong. Rec. 3146 (1890). Senator Hoar's remarks were made in answer to a pro-
posed amendment which would have allowed suits under that section to be brought in
state courts, as well as federal courts. He argued that this could not be done, since "no
court enforces penalties except those created by the authority which creates the court,"
and therefore a state court would not have the jurisdiction to enforce a treble damage
claim, such claim being "purely penal and punitive." Id. at 3147. These remarks were cited
with approval in Haskell v. Perkins, supra note 26.
28. See S. Rep. No. 619, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. (1955).
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Act was amended so as to allow the Government the right to sue civilly for any
actual damage suffered as a result of an antitrust violation.29 In explaining why
private plaintiffs could recover treble damages, whereas the Government would
only be allowed to recover actual damages suffered, a Senate Report commented
that since "the United States is ... charged by law with the enforcement of the
antitrust laws ... it would be wholly improper to write into the statute a provi-
sion whose chief purpose is to promote the institution of proceedings."3 This is
perhaps the strongest indication that the primary purpose of trebling the dam-
ages in private suits was to provide an incentive for plaintiffs who would be
faced with a long and costly lawsuit.31
The case law in this area has been equally inconclusive, largely due to the fact
that, as one court has put it, the terms penal and penalty "are in fact among the
most elastic terms known to law."'3 2 The Supreme Court, in Huntington v.
Attrill,33 recognized the fact that the words had been used commonly to include
"any extraordinary liability to which the law subjects the wrongdoer . . . not
limited to the damages suffered."'34 However, that Court held that "the test
whether a law is penal ... is whether the wrong sought to be redressed is a wrong
to the public, or a wrong to the individual. . . ."r, It is this test, that of public
versus private wrong, on which the IRS relied in support of its position in Rev-
enue Ruling 64-224. This test also explains the IRS position on payments to the
Government under section 4A as being non-deductible, since the money is being
paid to a governmental body as reparation for a public wrong.30
29. Clayton Act § 4A, 69 Stat. 282 (1955), 15 U.S.C. § 15(a) (1964).
30. S. Rep. No. 619, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1955). Under § 4A, the Government Is
considered solely as a buyer of goods. Ibid. A subordinate reason for allowing the Govern-
ment to sue for only actual, rather than treble, damages was the fear that many small com-
panies which dealt with the Government might fail if such liability were imposed. See 101
Cong. Rec. 5130 (1955) (remarks of Representative Keating); cf. note 87 infra.
31. See Donovan & Irvine, Proof of Damages Under the Anti-Trust Law, 88 U. Pa. L.
Rev. 511, 524-25 (1940). The liberalizing of the requisites for proving damages has raised
some question as to the continued need for a treble damage incentive. See text accompanying
notes 67-68 infra.
32. Ward v. Rice, 29 F. Supp. 714, 715 (EDl. Pa. 1939). Accord, Huntington v. Attrill,
146 U.S. 657, 666-67 (1892).
33. 146 U.S. 657 (1892).
34. Id. at 667.
35. Id. at 668.
36. Rev. Rul. 64-224, 1964-2 Cum. Bull. at 54. Congressman Celler has stated that the
"obvious unstated reason" why damages paid under § 4A were ruled non-deductible was
that the Government would never have been fully compensated were the taxpayer allowed
to deduct one-half of the payments from its income tax. Staff Study 58. Although the state-
ment is true as to the effect of allowing a deduction in § 4A situations, this effect, in and
of itself, should not be a sufficient reason for disallowing the deduction since the logical
conclusion from such a policy would be the denial of a deduction for any payments made
directly to the Government. It is obvious that such is not the intent of Congress since,
for example, interest paid to the Government on a back tax liability is a deductible expense
to the taxpayer. See 4A Mertens, Law of Federal Income Taxation § 26.09, at 44 (1966). The
pnactment of § 4A was necessitated by a Supreme Court ruling that the United States was
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The courts, however, have not felt themselves bound by this strict definition
in determining whether the treble damage provision was intended as a penalty
against the antitrust violator. Many courts, although admitting that a prime
purpose of the treble damage provision was to encourage the bringing of private
suits, so as to aid the Government in the enforcement of the antitrust lawsr
have reasoned that the augmented damages were adopted as a deterrent device,
and are therefore a penalty imposed on the violator.38
Since the purpose of the antitrust laws is to protect against restraints on
competition, every violation of such laws produces some amount of public harm,
if it is assumed that the public is harmed whenever free competition is
restrained.3 9 Thus, even though the private plaintiff has been injured in his busi-
ness,40 there is the additional injury to the public which is involved in the pri-
vate antitrust action. Therefore, the treble damage provision, under the public-
private wrong test, is at least partly punitive in that one of its purposes is to
remedy a wrong to the public.
The IRS, in support of its current position, relies on its stand on multiple
damage recoveries under the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942.41 Under
section 205(e) of that act, the terminal buyer could bring an action to recover
treble damages against a seller guilty of overcharges. 42 In I.T. 3627 4 released
in 1943, the IRS held such payments, when made to a consumer other than the
United States, "remedial in nature" and fully deductible as an ordinary and
not a "person" under § 8 of the Sherman Act and could not, therefore, sue for treble damages.
United States v. Cooper Corp., 312 U.S. 600, 614 (1941). Had the Government been given
the right to sue in its proprietary capacity under § 4, it would be difficult to imagine that
the same treatment afforded private taxpayers would not have been extended to payments
made to -the Government. Certainly, from a policy basis, it is difficult to see why payments
to the Government under § 4A should be non-deductible, especially in light of the fact
that the section was not enacted as a further means of enforcement of the antitrust laws.
37. Cf. 96 Cong. Rec. 10438, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. (1950) (remarks of Representative
Celler).
38. See, e.g., Leh v. General Petroleum Corp., 330 F.2d 288, 298 (9th Cir. 1964), rev'd
on other grounds, 382 U.S. 54 (1965); Flintkote Co. v. Lysfjord, 246 F.2d 368, 398 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 835 (1957); Banana Distribs., Inc. v. United Fruit Co, 158
F. Supp. 160, 163 (SDN.Y. 1957) ; Johnson v. Joseph Schlitz Brewing Co., 33 F. Supp. 176
(E.D. Tenn. 1940), aft'd, 123 F.2d 1016 (6th Cir. 1941).
39. "The Sherman Act was designed to be a comprehensive charter of economic liberty
aimed at preserving free and unfettered competition as the rule of trade. It rests on the
premise that the unrestrained interaction of competitive forces will yield the best allocation
of our economic resources, the lowest prices, the highest quality and the greatest material
progress, while at the same time providing an environment conducive to the preservation
of our democratic political and social institutions." Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States,
356 U.S. 1, 4 (1958).
40. Unless a taxpayer has suffered some damage in his business or property, he lacks
the standing to bring a § 4 suit. See Timberlake, Federal Treble Damage Antitrust Actions
§ 4.02, at 23 (1965).
41. Emergency Price Control Act, ch. 26, 56 Stat. 23 (1942).
42. Emergency Price Control Act, ch. 26, § 205(e), 56 Stat. 34 (1942).
43. 1943 Cum. Bull. 111.
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necessary business expense.4 4 However, there is language in at least one case
which creates some doubt as to whether the courts would have considered the
entire treble damage recovery as remedial. In Jerry Rossman Corp. v. Commis-
sioner, 4 5 a taxpayer unwittingly overcharged his customers in violation of the
Emergency Price Control Act of 1942. Upon ascertaining the overcharge, and
realizing that it would be impractical to return the charges to its customers, the
taxpayer paid the aggregate overcharge to the government in one lump sum. 40
He then deducted the payments on his tax return as ordinary and necessary
business expenses. In ruling the payment deductible, Judge Learned Hand,
speaking for the court, classified the payment as remedial, despite the fact that
a "punitive" portion equal to twice the amount of actual damages might have
been assessed.47 Thus, the language in Rossman seems to indicate that the addi-
tional two-thirds is in the nature of a penalty, rather than an enlarged remedial
recovery.48 It should be noted, however, that Judge Hand explicitly stated that
even had the payment been considered a penalty, it would not automatically
follow that the payment would have been deemed non-deductible. The court
would then have had to decide whether the allowance of the deduction would
frustrate any sharply defined Government policies embodied in the Emergency
Price Control Act of 1942.49
In another line of cases, the penal-remedial issue has arisen under state laws
providing for different periods of limitations for a penalty created by statute.
In City of Atlanta v. Chattanooga Foundry & Pipe Co.,50 cited by the IRS in
Revenue Ruling 64-224, the United States district court held that the antitrust
treble damage provision was not a penalty within the meaning of a Tennessee
statute of limitations. The court stated that:
The case . . . turns in part on the distinction between a penalty, as such, imposed
by statute for a breach of its provisions, by way of punishment for the act, and in the
public interest on the one hand, and a private remedy conferred on a person specially
injured . . . by way of compensation for the injury sustained, on the other. 5'
44. I.T. 3627 stated in part: "Amounts paid pursuant to judgments in favor of con-
sumers or tenants (other than the United States) in consumer actions under section 205(c) of
the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942 and amounts paid in compromise of pending or
contemplated litigation in such cases, are deductible as ordinary and necessary business
expenses under section 23(a)l(A) [now § 162(a)] of the Internal Revenue Code." 1943
Cum. Bull. 111.
45. 175 F.2d 711 (2d Cir. 1949).
46. The Government agreed not to press the taxpayer for more. Id. at 712.
47. Ibid.
48. Ibid. It should be noted, however, that the court did not hold the excess two-thirds
portion of the recovery to be punitive. It merely assumed the fact for the purpose of the
argument before it. Id. at 713.
49. Judge Hand stated that "there are 'penalties' and 'penalties,'" and that in every
case, the frustration question would have to be decided ad hoc. Ibid.
50. 101 Fed. 900 (ED. Tenn. 1900), rev'd on other grounds, 127 Fed. 23 (6th Cir. 1903),
aff'd, 203 U.S. 390 (1906).
51. Id. at 901-02.
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This represents the majority view,52 but there is a vociferous minority,53 exem-
plified by the recent Ninth Circuit decision in Leh v. General Petrolent Corp.5
In a well-documented opinion, Judge Barnes, a former Assistant Attorney Gen-
eral of the United States in charge of the Antitrust Division, after conceding
that one purpose of the multiple damage provision was to award damages that
were difficult of proof, concluded that:
What is recovered under Section 7 of the Sherman Act ... is no less a penalty on
the wrongdoer than is the fine and imprisonment with which the sovereign can
threaten the violator under Sections 1 and 2, or the forfeiture of articles transported
in commerce, as provided for in Section 6.55
In two other situations, the purpose of the treble damage statute was indicated
as punitive. In Haskell v. Perkins,"6 the question was whether the violator's
estate should be liable for treble damages. The court held that punitive dam-
ages do not survive, and that since treble damages were punitive in nature, the
estate of the wrongdoer would only be liable for actual damages.5 7 In the other
situation, the wrongdoer had a set-off in a treble damage action. The court held
that the set-off should be taken after the damages have been trebled, so as not
to frustrate "the punitive purpose of the law."'5 s However, another line of cases
has held that a claim for treble damages is assignable, 0 thereby suggesting a
non-punitive purpose in the treble damage statute.0°
As has been previously stated, a statute may be penal for one purpose and
still be non-penal for another. 6 ' The pertinent question for tax purposes is
whether the statute is a penalty within the doctrine of Tank Truck RentalsG2--
that is, whether the allowance of the deduction would frustrate the sharply de-
fined public policies embodied in the antitrust laws.(n
52. See, e.g., Reid v. Doubleday & Co., 109 F. Supp. 354, 362-63 (ND. Ohio 1952);
Christensen v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 95 F. Supp. 446, 449 (D. Utah 1950); Momand v.
Universal Film Exch., Inc., 43 F. Supp. 996, 1008 (D. Mass. 1942).
53. See, e.g., Leh v. General Petroleum Corp., 330 F2d 288, 298-99 (9th Cir. 1964),
rev'd on other grounds, 382 U.S. 54 (1965); Hoskins Coal & Dock Corp. v. Truax Traer
Coal Co, 191 F.2d 912, 914 (7th Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 947 (1952).
54. 330 Fa2d 288 (9th Cir. 1964), rev'd on other grounds, 382 US. 54 (1965).
55. Id. at 298-99.
56. 28 F.2d 222 (D.N.J. 1928), rev'd on other grounds, 31 F.2d 53 (3rd Cir.), cert.
denied, 279 U.S. 872 (1929).
57. Id. at 223.
58. Bal Theatre Corp. v. Paramount Film Distrib. Corp., 206 F. Supp. 708, 716
(N.D. Cal. 1962).
59. See Momand v. Twentieth-Century Fox Film Corp., 37 F. Supp. 649 (W.D. 0kla.
1941).
60. While the right to recover damages is generally considered a property right and
therefore assignable, the right to recover punitive damages is not. See Oleck, Damages to
Persons and Property § 68 (rev. ed. 1961).
61. Cox v. Lykes Bros., 237 N.Y. 376, 143 N.E. 226 (1924); Loucks v. Standard Oil Co.,
224 N.Y. 99, 120 N.E. 198 (1918).
62. Tank Truck Rentals, Inc. v. Commissioner, 356 U.S. 30 (1958).
63. See text accompanying notes 77-100, infra.
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It would be difficult to controvert the fact that the primary purpose of the
treble damage provision, at least at the time of its enactment, was to encourage
the bringing of private suits. 64 It was felt that the nature of the damages suf-
fered by the injured competitor were almost impossible to prove with any degree
of exactness or certainty,65 and that, therefore, the treble damages amounted
to liquidated compensation for "accumulative intangible harm going beyond the
ordinarily recoverable legal damages to the business or property."0 0l
However, the ancient and strict requirements of proving the exact amount
of damages have been largely abrogated in recent years.0 7 The 1955 Report of
the Attorney General's National Committee to Study the Antitrust Laws con-
cluded that:
The inducement of mandatory trebled damages is no longer necessary to encourage
suits by injured persons. The development of both the procedural and substantive
law, largely favorable to the plaintiff, plus the award of attorney fees, affords suffi-
cient incentive to private antitrust actions.
Also, liberal requirements for proof of damages suggest that, even in the absence of
mandatory trebling, plaintiffs may secure ample recompense.08
In accordance with those findings, the Report recommended the elimination of
mandatory trebling, and vesting in the trial judge the discretion to impose
double or treble damages as he felt was necessary to punish the "purposeful
violator," while leaving him free to refuse to impose "the harsh penalty of
multiple damages on innocent actors." 69 Had this view been accepted, and
multiple damage awards placed within the discretion of the trial judge, there
would have been no question that the nature of the treble damages were puni-
tive and not compensatory, since they would have been added only in cases of
deliberate violations of the antitrust laws. However, this proposal met with stiff
opposition 70 and bills introduced in Congress calling for discretionary trebling
died in committee.71
The United States Supreme Court has held, in Commissioner v. Glenshawv
Glass Co.,7 2 that the additional two-thirds recovery in a treble damage action
is includable in a taxpayer's gross income. In William Goldman Theatres, Inc.,73
64. See note 37 supra; cf. S. Rep. No. 619, 84th Cong., 1st Sess. (1955); 96 Cong. Rec.
10438 (1950).
65. See Donovan & Irvine, Proof of Damages Under the Anti-Trust Law, 88 U. Pa. L.
Rev. 511, 512 (1940).
66. Vold, Are Threefold Damages Under the Anti-Trust Act Penal or Compensatory?,
28 Ky. L.J. 117, 159 (1940).
67. See, e.g., Bigelow v. RKO Radio Pictures, Inc., 327 U.S. 251 (1946).
68. 1955 Att'y Gen. Natl Comm. Antitrust Rep. 379.
69. Ibid.
70. See McConnell, The Treble Damage Issue: A Strong Dissent, 50 Nw. U.L. Rev.
342 (1955).
71. See, e.g., H.R. 4597, 83d Cong. 1st Sess. (1953).
72. 348 U.S. 426, 432-33 (1955).
73. 19 T.C. 637 (1953), aff'd sub nom. Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 211 F.2d
928 (3d Cir. 1954), rev'd, 348 U.S. 426 (1955).
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the taxpayer had been awarded $375,000 in treble damages but only reported
$125,000 as taxable income. The Tax Court held the two-thirds portion to be
punitive in nature, stating:
It is proper for us to conclude that the part of the award which represents loss of
profits is compensatory in that it makes the injured petitioner whole. Likewise, that
part of the award in excess of compensation is punitive damages. Of the statutory
threefold damages, we conclude that one part is compensatory and two parts are
punitive .... 74
On appeal to the Supreme Court, it was held that even if the damages were to
be considered as punitive, they still must be reported as gross income.75 Al-
though the Court constantly referred to the two-thirds portion as "punitive,"




There is nothing in the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 which disallows de-
ductions on grounds of public policy. However, the Supreme Court, in Tank
Truck Rentals, Inc. v. Commissioner,77 expressly held a payment to be non-
deductible on public policy grounds. There, the taxpayer had incurred fines of
over $41,000 for violation of state maximum weight laws. In denying the deduc-
tion, the Court found that an allowance of the deduction would have frustrated
the state policy behind such statutes, since it would have encouraged violation
of the state law by increasing the odds in favor of non-compliance. 78 The Court
carefully commented that the standards for deductibility had to be flexible
enough to accommodate both the Congressional intent to tax net income only,
and the presumption against a Congressional intent to encourage a violation of
an expressed public policy.79 Therefore, the Tank Truck Court held that "the
severity and immediacy of the frustration resulting from allowance of the deduc-
tion" should be the test for determining deductibility.8 0 In Tank Truck, the
Court found that the taxpayer had weighed the cost of compliance with the
maximum weight statute against the chances of detection, and had decided
that it was economically advantageous to violate the statute."' The Court rea-
74. Id. at 640.
75. Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426 (1955).
76. Had the Supreme Court found the two-thirds portion of the treble damage pay-
ment to be remedial, then there would have been no doubt as to its full inclusion in ordinary
income. Therefore, the Court assumed it to be punitive, and then went on to hold that the
full recovery would be taxed as ordinary income in either situation.
77. 356 U.S. 30 (1958).
78. Id. at 34.
79. Id. at 35.
8o. Ibid.
81. The defendant had to operate his trucks through other states, all of which allowed
a greater weight over their highways than did Pennsylvania. Rather than operate his trucks
at less than full loads, he chose to chance being caught in a violation of the Pennsylvania
maximum weight statute. Id. at 33.
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soned that this calculated risk would be made more attractive if a tax deduction
were to be allowed for payments of fines charged against the violators of the
statute . 2 Thus, the frustration which would occur from an allowance of the
deduction was judged to be severe and immediate.
The IRS, in issuing Revenue Ruling 64-224, appears to have completely re-
versed its prior public policy position on the deductibility issue. 88 In a 1960
letter to the Chief of the Joint Committee on Internal Revenue Taxation, Colin
F. Stam, the IRS position was stated to be strongly against allowing the deduc-
tion in cases of "clear violations" of the antitrust laws, since to allow deduc-
tions in such cases would diminish the effectiveness of the existing antitrust
legislation.8 4 The Staff of the Joint Committee on Internal Revenue Taxation
found that the courts probably would have supported this 1960 position had
the situation been presented to them for adjudication."5
However, in 1965, Nicholas deB. Katzenbach, while Acting United States
Attorney General, commented that the public policy behind the antitrust laws
would not necessarily be frustrated by allowing the deduction:
[U]nder today's maximum corporate tax rate of approximately 50 percent, with
trebling of damages the adjudicated violator will still be out of pocket approximately
150 per cent of actual damages in a situation where he has already paid a tax on any
income derived from the violation. In these circumstances, and in view of the potential
disruption and expense of complex legal proceedings, it is unlikely that the allowance
of deductions will make potential antitrust violators feel that a treble damage suit
is a business risk to be assessed lighty.8 6
It would seem that if it is in the public interest to have vigorous private en-
forcement8 7 of the antitrust laws, as a supplement to the enforcement supplied
82. Id. at 35.
83. Staff Study 8, 9.
84. Letter From Acting IRS Commissioner Bertrand M. Harding to Colin F. Stam,
October 18, 1961, in Staff Study 28. However, the letter stated that the deduction would be
allowed in cases where the taxpayer's acts were not clear violations of the antitrust laws,
"since in those cases it could not be stated that there was a violation of a 'sharply defined
policy.'" Ibid. Such a view would be consistent with the "hard core" approach suggested
in the Staff Study and in S. 3650. See note 130 infra.
85. See Staff Study 9. The Report, however, found enough uncertainty in the public
policy doctrine that it could not classify Rev. Rul. 64-224 as "wrong" or "improper." Ibid.
86. Letter From Nicholas deB. Katzenbach to Laurence N. Woodworth, February 8,
1965, in Staff Study 61-62. (Footnote omitted.)
87. Although it might appear that from the standpoint of antitrust enforcement It would
be desirable to deny a deduction in all cases of treble damage payments, it has been pointed
out that this would put a small competitor at a disadvantage with a corporate "giant"
where both have been burdened with treble damage suits arising out of the same antitrust
violation. Staff Study 38-39. Whereas the "giant" would have no trouble in raising sufficient
capital to satisfy its treble damage debts, the smaller violator might be placed at a com-
petitive disadvantage if disallowed a deduction on their treble damage payments and settle-
ments. This possible harm to competition is borne out by the fact that the Attorney General
settled on much more lenient terms with the small manufacturers than he did with General
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by the Government,"8 the primary concern of Congress and the courts should
be to supply sufficient incentive 9 to private plaintiffs, so that they will prosecute
private actions in cases where they are injured due to violations of the antitrust
laws. Therefore, it would seem that the prevailing rule which treats treble dam-
age recoveries as taxable ordinary income ° poses a more severe threat to the
public policies behind the antitrust laws than does the policy of allowing the
wrongdoing taxpayer to deduct the treble damage payments. For, if the private
plaintiff feels that it is not worth his time and effort in bringing a long and
costly 9 ' action if his actual recovery is substantially reduced,9 2 the number of
private suits will decrease sharply, and the private antitrust action will no longer
be an effective supplement to Government enforcement of the antitrust laws.
On the other hand, from the standpoint of the private plaintiff, whether or not
Electric and Westinghouse in the electrical equipment cases. General Electric Company,
the largest company involved, paid nearly $7.5 million in settlements to the federal govern-
ment, representing 10.73% of General Electric's sales to federal agencies. On the other
hand, the Attorney General settled with the seven smallest manufacturers for amounts
representing between 2 and 3 percent of their respective sales to federal agencies. Ibid. In
the case of one of the smallest companies involved in the electrical equipment conspiracies,
Lapp Insulator Company, Inc., approximately 100 lawsuits were instituted against it, of
which 65 percent were successfully settled. This settlement program was entered into in
reliance on Rev. Rul. 64-224 and, as was stated by the president of the company, any
reversal of the ruling "would double the cost to us of the settlements previously negotiated
and, in view of our limited capital resources, would seriously jeopardize our competitive
position." Letter From Brent Mills to Laurence N. Woodworth, Feb. 16, 1965, in Ill Cong.
Rec. 8101 (daily ed. April 26, 1965).
88. See, e.g., Bruce's juices, Inc. v. American Can Co., 330 U.S. 743, 751 (1947).
89. The incentive provided by Congress was the recovery of threefold the damages
sustained and proved. Clayton Act § 4, 38 Stat. 731 (1914), 15 US.C. § 15 (1964) ; accord,
S. Rep. No. 619, 84th Cong, 1st Sess. 2-3 (1955).
90. See Commissioner v. Gleashaw Glass Co., 348 U.S. 426 (1955).
91. See Loevinger, Private Action-The Strongest Pillar of Antitrust, 3 Antitrust Bull.
167, 173 (1958).
92. It should, of course, be realized that even under the Glenshaw Glass ruling, the
injured taxpayer would be recovering 150% of his proved damages. Furthermore, since
any revenue which the private plaintiff would have collected if not for the antitrust vio-
lation would have been taxed at the rate of approximately 50%, the injured taxpayer has
really recovered three times his actual loss. For example, if a private plaintiff proves $100
damage in his § 4 suit, the trebled award would be $300. Since the entire award is taxable
as ordinary income, the taxpayer must pay $150 to the federal government. He is left
with a net recovery of $150. Since the $100, had it not been lost, would have been taxed at
50%, the actual money lost by the plaintiff was only $50. Therefore, the $150 net recovery
represents three times the amount lost.
For any substantial decrease to occur, the treble damage provision would itself have
to be changed and, as noted previously, Congress has not seen fit to enact the proposed
changes. See notes 70-71 supra and accompanying text. However, the United States Attorney
General does not feel that the typical private plaintiff would no longer bring a § 4 action
if the treble damage incentive were to be removed. See 1955 Att'y Gen. Nat'l Comm. Anti-
trust Rep. 379.
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the deduction is allowed to the wrongdoer is not a primary consideration in
arriving at his decision to bring a private action.93
The major difficulty in dealing with the public policy limitation on the de-
duction of ordinary and necessary business expenses lies in the indefinite guide-
lines set forth in Tank Truck. Although we are told that the test is the "severity
and immediacy" of the frustration, the criteria for determining "severity and
immediacy" is largely unclear. In Tank Truck, the taxpayer was fined for vio-
lating a state penal statute, and the payment of the fine was made to the same
authority which was charged with the enforcement of such statute. In Commis-
sioner v. Sullivan,94 decided by the Supreme Court on the same day as Tank
Truck, the taxpayer had received income from bookmaking establishments,
illegal under state law. The taxpayer listed rents, utilities and wages paid to
employees as deductible expenditures. Although such expenditures were in them-
selves illegal under state law, the Supreme Court allowed the deductions, rea-
soning that they had only a remote relation to the illegal act of operating a
gambling business, and, therefore, the deductions would not frustrate the con-
sequences of violating a law (as was the case in Tank Truck). The Court
found these expenses to be clearly ordinary and necessary. The latest Supreme
Court decision on the deductibility issue was handed down last year in Com-
missioner v. Tellier.96 In that case, the taxpayer deducted his legal expenses
incurred in the unsuccessful defense of a criminal charge. In allowing the
deduction, the Court stated that "where Congress has been wholly silent, it is
only in extremely limited circumstances" that deductions will be disallowed. 97
If the test to be applied is whether allowing the deduction will frustrate the
consequences of violating a law, then perhaps the sources of enforcement of a
particular law should be looked to as a "frustration indicator." In the Tank
Truck situation, the fines levied by the state were the sole means of enforcing
the maximum weight statute, and any dilution of the fine, brought about by
the allowance of a tax deduction, would have a great effect on the consequences
of violating such a law. In contrast, the payment of wages and rent in Sullivan
were paid -to individuals who were in no way charged with enforcement of the
anti-gambling laws. The disallowance of the deduction would only be one small
consequence of violating such laws, and the primary measures of enforcement,
namely criminal penalties imposed by the state against gambling operators,
would still operate as an effective enforcement of the anti-gambling laws. The
93. This is not to say that the private plaintiff has no interest whatsoever in the tax
treatment of the treble damage payments from the standpoint of the wrongdoer. Deductibility
might encourage larger settlements. Further, the private plaintiff would be concerned were
the allowance of the deduction greatly to reduce the deterrent effect of the treble damage
suit. However, the allowance of the deduction would not have such an effect on the deterrent
effect of the private damage action. See text accompanying notes 91-93 infra.
94. 356 U.S. 27 (1958).
95. Id. at 28.
96. 383 U.S. 687 (1966).
97. Id. at 693-94. The Court cited as an example of these "limited circumstances" Com-
missioner v. Heininger, 320 U.S. 467 (1943).
[Vol. 35
TREBLE DAMAGES
situation of treble damage payments fits somewhere between these two extremes.
The consequences that one might suffer if caught in an antitrust law violation
can vary from a criminal conviction, whereby the offending corporation can be
fined, or its officers fined or imprisoned, or both, to cease and desist orders,
injunctions, and private treble damage judgments. Therefore, unlike the Tank
Truck situation, the violator cannot accurately ascertain the amount of his
potential liability. In most hard-core violations, he is unable to know how many
competitors will be injured due to the antitrust violation, nor can he ascertain
the amount of damages which any one party will incur. Furthermore, he cannot
know whether or not the Government will institute proceedings, either in its
official or proprietary capacity. 8 Even assuming that the only suit with which
the violator will be faced is the private treble damage action (and this will not
occur often, since in many cases the private plaintiff waits for the Government
to sue, and then uses the Government conviction for prima fade evidence), he
still can do no more than predict that the final treble damage sum assessed
against him will be halved by the deduction. And this fact standing alone has
little meaning to the prospective violator since he does not know the principal
sum on which the reduction of one-half will be taken. Therefore, it would seem
that the allowance of the deduction does little to improve the "risk ratio" of
a potential antitrust violator, and thus it is questionable whether the public
policies behind the antitrust laws would be "severely and immediately" frus-
trated by allowing the treble damage payment to be deducted.
However, this discourse on the applicability of the Tank Truck doctrine to
treble damage payments probably will be rendered academic should any of the
proposed legislation be enacted.
IV. PROPOSED LEGISLATION
The various legislative proposals regarding the tax treatment of treble dam-
age payments, while similar in attempting to change Revenue Ruling 64-224,
have proceeded along two distinctly separate paths. The first type, represented
by the bill of Congressman Celler,99 calls for the amendment of section 4 of the
Clayton Act. Congressman Celler's bill, H.R. 2514, calls for the addition of the
following subsection:
(b) In any action pending or instituted under subsection (a) of this section on or after
the date of enactment of this subsection, the amount recovered in excess of the dam-
ages sustained shall not be treated as income for purposes of any law of the United
States imposing a tax on income. In any action pending or instituted under subsection(a) of this section or under section 4A of this Act on or after the date of enactment
of this subsection, no payment made by any defendant pursuant to any judgment or
settlement of such action shall be deductible as ordinary and necessary expense under
any law of the United States imposing a tax on income.100
98. A successful Government suit in either instance may be used by a private plaintiff
as prima fade evidence against the same defendant "as to all matters respecting which
said judgment or decree would be an estoppel as between the parties thereto . . . . Clayton
Act § 5 (a), 38 Stat. 731 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 16(a) (1964).




It should be noted at the outset that this bill takes a two-pronged approach
to the problem. The purpose of the first sentence of subsection (b) is to insure
that the needed incentive for the bringing of private antitrust actions will not
be lessened by the imposition of an income tax on the "punitive" portion of the
recovery. The enactment of this portion of the Celler bill would directly con-
tradict the Supreme Court holding in Glenshaw Glass.110
The second sentence of subsection (b) represents a strict, and perhaps in-
accurate, appraisal of the possible frustration of antitrust policy caused by the
allowance of the treble damage payment deduction. Were this portion of the
Celler bill to be enacted, the entire amount of any judgment or settlement of
any private antitrust action would be non-deductible to the wrongdoing tax-
payer. There are several arguments that can be raised in opposition to this por-
tion of H.R. 2514. Perhaps the most obvious objection is that, assuming the
two-thirds portion of the damages to be punitive rather than compensatory, the
payment of the actual damages is not allowed to be deducted. Even those au-
thorities who strongly advocated labeling two-thirds of the treble damage re-
covery as "punitive" generally agreed that the first third of the recovery was
compensatory for actual damages suffered. 10 2 And although it has been stated
that "the same provision may be penal as to the offender and remedial as to
the sufferer,"'0 3 few authorities have interpreted this statement as dictating
that the entire amount of a treble damage payment be deemed penal and there-
fore non-deductible. 10 4
A second possible objection to the "absolute" approach of the Celler bill is
that it treats all treble damage payments alike; that is, the inadvertent violator
is treated no better than the purposeful conspirator.10 There is language in Tank
Truck which might be said to support the Celler view. In that case, the Court
stated that since the maximum weight statute involved made no distinction be-
tween willful and inadvertent violations, "state policy is as much thwarted in
the one instance as in the other." 0 0 In the case of the majority of antitrust
101. See text accompanying note 75 supra. At least one writer has suggested that such a
measure is necessary if we are to restore the historic purpose of the antitrust treble damage
section. Wright, A Tax Formula to Restore the Historical Effects of the Antitrust Treble
Damage Provisions, 65 Mich. L. Rev. 245, 249 (1966). Actually, this author realized that
to allow the two-thirds portion of the recovery to be treated as non-taxable income would
more than restore the pre-Glenshaw stimulant, since prior to Glenshaw, it was not certain
that the two-thirds could be excluded from ordinary income. See id. at 256.
102. See, e.g., William Goldman Theaters, Inc., 19 T.C. 637, 640 (1953), aff'd sub nom.
Commissioner v. Glenshaw Glass Co., 211 F.2d 928 (1954), rev'd, 348 U.S. 426 (1955).
103. Cox v. Lykes, 237 N.Y. 376, 380, 143 N.E. 226, 227 (1924). (Citations omitted,)
104. But see 113 U. Pa. L. Rev. 954, 958 (1965).
105. H.R. 2514 encompasses all § 4 suits, which could include inadvertent as well as
purposeful violations of the antitrust laws. There is language in the Jerry Rossman case
to indicate a difference in treatment for inadvertent and purposeful violators of the
Emergency Price Control Act of 1942, and, the Tank Truck Court pointed out that the
OPA Administrator had differentiated between willful and innocent violators. Tank Truck
Rentals, Inc. v. Commissioner, 356 U.S. 30, 37 (1958).
106. Id. at 36; accord, Hoover Motor Express Co. v. United States, 356 U.S. 38, 40 (1958).
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statutes, as with the maximum weight statute, it is a proscribed act which is
punished,10 7 and the statutes make little if any distinction between a willful and
inadvertent violation. However, there are also great differences in the nature
of the two types of statutes. In the case of the maximum weight statute, the
proscribed action is dearly ascertainable, and where the taxpayer commits an
infraction, albeit inadvertent, he should not be heard to complain, since it was
fully within his power to comply with such statute. The situation in regard to
the antitrust laws is much different. Unlike the maximum weight statute, the
acts proscribed by the antitrust laws are complex, vague and often remain un-
clear even after lengthy litigation. 0 8 Whereas the inadvertent violator of a
maximum weight statute could almost certainly have avoided the violation had
he exercised a greater degree of care, this cannot accurately be said of the in-
advertent violator of an antitrust statute. Therefore, the inadvertent antitrust
violator will not be made to act with a greater degree of care by disallowing
him a deduction of his treble damage payments.l ° s a Still uncertain as to the acts
proscribed by the antitrust laws, he is certainly capable of committing another
inadvertent violation at a later date.
Another aspect of the Celler proposal which might create some controversy
is the non-deductibility of payments made in settlement of pending treble dam-
107. Examples of such proscribed acts are price discrimination, discrimination in services,
conspiracies in restraint of trade, mergers which tend to lessen competition in any line of
commerce, etc.
108. Nowhere is this uncertainty greater than in the field of asset acquisitions. Section
7 of the Clayton Act, the anti-merger provision of the antitrust laws, states that: "No cor-
poration [engaged in commercd] ... shall acquire ... the whole or any part of... the asets
of one or more corporations ... where in any line of commerce in any section of the country,
the effect of such acquisition may be substantially to lessen competition, or to tend
to create a monopoly." 38 Stat. 731 (1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1964). One of
the key factors in determining whether there has been a lessening of competition is the show-
ing of a trend toward concentration in the particular industry involved. See Brown Shoe
Co. v. United States, 370 US. 294 (1962). However, in the most recent Supreme Court
decision, the Court applied a different criteria for measuring this trend than it had applied
in the previous cases. In the previous cases, as typified by Brown Shoe, concentration was
found to exist where a large portion of an industry was controlled by only a few companies
-i.e., where the top four companies controlled 255 of the market in that product. However,
in United States v. Von's Grocery Co., 384 U.S. 270 (1966), this factor was not present, as
the grocery market was completely fragmentized. However, the Court found a trend toward
concentration from the fact that the number of small competitors had decreased over a
period of time. Certainly the defendants in Von's could not have known, at least from
the prior judicial decisions, that their actions would violate the anti-merger clause of the
Clayton Act. This is clear from the dissenting opinion which asserts that it is possible that
there will be no lessening of competition even though the number of competitors has de-
creased. Id. at 282-83 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
108a. Of course, by realizing that the penalties for violating a law are severe, the tax-
payer will usually exercise a greater degree of care in ascertaining the legality of his pro-
spective acts. But as already stated, there are certainly enough other sanctions involved in




age litigation. The Attorney General bad suggested that a distinction could be
made between money paid to satisfy judgments and payments made by way of
settlement.10 9 He reasoned that this would promote respect for the antitrust
laws while at the same time encourage settlements. However, his suggestion was
based purely on an antitrust viewpoint, and when the IRS informed him that
such distinction could not be maintained as a matter of tax law, the Attorney
General deferred to the IRS judgment.1 0 The Celler and IRS view on this issue
appears correct."'
One other objection raised to the Celler proposal is that the bill, in effect,
would allow the injured party to receive five times his after-tax loss and the
violator would pay six times his after-tax gain. 12 The bill would, thus, appear
to impose sextuple rather than treble damages." 3 This approach could sub-
stantially weaken the competitive position of a company which inadvertently
violated the antitrust laws.
A different legislative approach to the treble damage deductibility problem
appears in Senator Long's proposed amendment to section 162 of the Internal
Revenue Code. The bill," 4 insofar as it related to treble damage payments,""
stated:
(g) . . . If in a criminal proceeding a taxpayer is convicted of a violation of the
antitrust laws, no deduction shall be allowed under subsection (a) for two-thirds of
any amount paid or incurred-
(1) on any judgment for damages entered against the taxpayer under section 4 of
the [Clayton Act] . . . on account of such violation or any related violation of the
antitrust laws which occurred prior to the date of the final judgment of such con-
viction, or
(2) in settlement of any action brought under section 4 on account of such viola-
tion or related violation.
109. Letter From Nicholas deB. Katzenbach to Laurence N. Woodworth, February 8,
1965, in Staff Study 60.
110. Id. at 61-62.
111. However advantageous a policy of encouraging settlements might be, if It Is to
be assumed that an important public policy embodied in the antitrust laws is frustrated
whenever a deduction is allowed for payments made pursuant to a treble damage judgment,
it would be difficult to imagine how the same public policy is not frustrated when a de-
duction is allowed for payments made in settlement of a law suit brought for the com-
mission of the identical act.
112. "Assume that a corporate seller receives an extra $100 because of a price-fixlng
conspiracy. Its gain, and the other party's damage, after taxes is $50. If the seller has to
pay $300 in treble damages, that is, three times the overcharge, without being able to
take a deduction, it will be out of pocket six times its net gain or six times the other party's
net injury." 112 Cong. Rec. 22220-21 (daily ed. Sept. 20, 1966) (remarks of Senator
Hruska). Similarly if the injured party's loss was $100, its loss in effect would be $50. It
would receive $300 in treble damage payments. Under the Celler bill only amount repre-
senting actual damages would be taxable or $100. In effect, the injured party would re-
ceive $250 or five times its after-tax damages.
113. 112 Cong. Rec. 22221 (daily ed. Sept. 20, 1966) (remarks of Senator Hruska).
114. S. 3650, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966).
115. S. 3650 also deals with fines and penalties, and bribes and illegal kickbacks.
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Unlike the Celler bill, S. 3650 dealt solely with the deductibility aspect of the
treble damage payments, taking no position on the tax treatment of a treble
damage recovery. Under the Long bill, the non-deductibility applies only to
two-thirds of the payments, the initial one-third being fully deductible as a
remedial payment.116 Payments made in satisfaction of judgments are given
the same treatment as settlements. Treble damages paid out due to inadvertent
violations of the antitrust laws would appear to be deductible. It is only in
cases where the taxpayer has been convicted of a criminal violation of the
antitrust laws, and a treble damage judgment is entered against the taxpayer
on account of such violation, that the deduction will be disallowed under the
Long proposal. Thus, S. 3650 would operate in a small percentage of antitrust
cases, since the large majority of antitrust suits are of a non-criminal nature." 7
In the case of inadvertent violations of the antitrust laws, the usual Govern-
mental action is to seek an injunction or a cease and desist order against the
alleged violator. The criminal proceeding is limited to willful, hard-core anti-
trust violations. 118
There is some evidence to support an even more restrictive interpretation of
S. 3650. Senator Long, in his statements before the Senate made immediately
prior to his introduction of this bill, commented that:
The denial of a deduction for treble damage payments in effect is limited to cases
where there has been a "sharply defined" violation of the antitrust laws. The uncer-
tainty of the application of the antitrust laws is such that a sense of fairplay would
seem to require such a limitation. To limit the denial to sharply defined violations,
the denial of the deduction is limited to those damage payments arising out of cases
in which the courts have imposed criminal sanctions against oficers of the
companies. 1 19
As stated above, criminal proceedings are relatively rare in antitrust actions,
and the severe measure of imposing criminal sanctions against the officers of
the violating companies is a step that the courts have been reluctant to take
except in the case of a most flagrant criminal antitrust violation. 20 It can
116. See Staff Study 15; 112 Cong. Rec. 16184 (daily ed. July 25, 1966) (remarks of
Senator Long).
117. In 1958, of the 325 antitrust suits which were commenced by the Government, only
22 were criminal cases. In 1960, the ratio was 27 out of 315; in 1964, 24 out of 446. 1964
Reports of the Proceedings of the Judicial Conference of the United States 151.
118. "The two most common forms of legal action brought by the Government under
the antitrust laws are criminal suits and civil actions seeking to enjoin illegal conduct of
the kind that has been engaged in. An antitrust criminal action is normally brought when it
appears from the evidence that there has been a 'per se violation,' such as price-fixing, the
allocation of territories or customers, boycotts, pools, or tying agreements, or when it
appears that there has been a willful violation of the law. In other situations, the Depart-
ment [of Justice] will normally institute a civil suit." Van Cise, Understanding the Anti-
trust Laws 248 (rev. ed. 1966).
119. 112 Cong. Rec. 16183 (daily ed. July 25, 1966) (remarks of Senator Long). (Em-
phasis added.)
120. The electrical conspiracy cases were examples of such flagrant antitrust violations.
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easily be seen, therefore, that if the legislative intent behind S. 3650, as
evidenced by the statements of Senator Long, is read to limit the denial of the
deduction to those few cases where criminal sanctions have been imposed on
the officers of the violating corporation, the effect of the proposed bill on the
deductibility of treble damage payments will be minimal.121 There is authority
to support such a reading of the Long bill, since S. 3650 is merely a codification
of the recommendations of the Staff of the Joint Committee on Internal Reve-
nue Taxation,'2 and one such recommendation was to limit the non-deduct-
ibility to cases where such criminal sanctions had been imposed on the officers. 12"
However, there is a stronger possibility that the bill would be interpreted
literally by the courts, so as to extend its coverage to all cases where the tax-
payer, both individual and corporate, has been criminally convicted of an
antitrust violation. 124
V. CONCLUSION
In allowing all treble damage payments to be deductible to the taxpayer as
an ordinary and necessary business expense, the IRS should not have placed
its sole reliance on the categorization of treble damages as remedial. Although
the weight of authority supports the proposition that the primary purpose of
the treble damage action was to encourage the bringing of private suits, there
is a large body of authority which considers the trebling of damages to be a
penalty imposed on the wrongdoer, acting as a deterrent to future violations.
The study undertaken by the Staff of the Joint Committee on Internal Revenue
Taxation found both elements present in the treble damage statute .'2
Seven corporate officers were actually imprisoned, while 23 others were given suspended
sentences and put on probation. Staff Study 2.
121. There were only 24 criminal antitrust actions litigated in 1964. Of the 143 con-
victions arising out of those actions, 3 resulted in imprisonments, 5 in probations, and 135
in fines. Although the statistics are unclear as to the breakdown of the fines, It can be
safely assumed that a large percentage were levied against the defendant-corporations,
rather than their officers. 1964 Reports of the Proceedings of the Judicial Conference of
the United States 151, 260.
122. Compare S. 3650, 89th Cong., 2d Sess. (1966), with the bill suggested In Staff Study
16-17.
123. Staff Study 13.
124. There is evidence that this is the proper reading of the statute's real purpose, since
both Senator Long and the Staff of the Joint Committee stated that "if the taxpayer had
been convicted in a criminal proceeding, he was protected by the requirement that the
prosecutor must prove him guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. In such a case it is clear that
the taxpayer's payment was in violation of the public policy involved. Denial of the deduc-
tion of the payment can then be justified on the ground that the deduction would clearly
frustrate a sharply defined public policy." Staff Study 14; accord, 112 Cong. Rec. 16183
(daily ed. July 25, 1966) (remarks of Senator Long). This indicates that any criminal
violation forming the basis for a treble damage suit would be sufficient grounds for dis-
allowing the deduction, regardless of the fact that sanctions were not imposed on the officers
of the violators.
125. See Staff Study 2-6; accord, Letter From Nicholas deB. Katzenbach to Laurence
N. Woodworth, February 8, 1965, in Staff Study 61.
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The crucial issue is that of public policy. In Revenue Ruling 64-224, the IRS
limited its policy discussions to the remedial, as opposed to penal, nature of the
treble damage provision. However, the relevant public policy considerations go
far beyond the penal-remedial dichotomy. Even if it were true that the primary
purpose of the treble damage provision is to punish the antitrust violator, it
would not automatically follow that the allowance of a deduction for such pay-
ments would frustrate the public policies embodied in the antitrust laws. 26 By
the same token, the mere fact that the purpose behind a statute is primarily
compensatory does not free payments made under such statute from public
policy considerations.
Representative Celler has stated that to allow the deduction of treble damage
payments would lessen the "sting" of the statute's punitive effect, and has at
least implied that where the sting is lessened, there will be a frustration of the
relevant policies involved. 127 However, although the Tank Truck Court did speak
of the dangers of "reducing the sting" in relation to frustrations of public pol-
icy,' 28 the doctrine, as set forth in that case, and as further explained in Sullivan
and Tellier, envisions a frustration that is both "immediate" and "severe"; that
is, a situation where a prospective wrongdoer, after considering that he will be
allowed to deduct certain payments, violates a statute because the lessened con-
sequences have made the risk involved worthwhile. It is submitted that a pro-
spective antitrust violator would not fall within that category.
One argument has been submitted in favor of the IRS withdrawing Revenue
Ruling 64-224. Since no taxpayer will challenge a rule allowing complete de-
ductibility, and since the Government cannot bring a suit to challenge its own
ruling, 29 the IRS position, if allowed to remain in its present form, will be
beyond judicial determination.130 It is argued that had the IRS taken a contrary
position, or at the least remained neutral in the matter, the final determination
as to whether any antitrust public policies had been frustrated in allowing a
treble damage deduction would have been left to the courts. However, while
perhaps it would have been wiser for the IRS to have deferred to the judiciary
in this matter, the fact remains that the IRS chose to take a position in favor
of complete deductibility and, due to the fact that so many companies have
entered into settlements in reliance on the ruling,' 3 ' it is highly unlikely that the
IRS will now reverse its stand.'3 2 Therefore, any changes in the present tax
treatment of treble damage payments must originate with Congress.
126. Jerry Rossman Corp. v. Commissioner, 175 F.2d 711, 713-14 (2d Cir. 1949).
127. See Statement of Hon. Emanuel Celler Submitted to the Joint Committee on In-
ternal Revenue Taxation, in Staff Study 46.
128. Tank Truck Rentals, Inc. v. Commissioner, 356 U.S. 30, 3S-36 (1958).
129. Staff Study 59.
130. See Comment, 60 Nw. U.L. Rev. 233, 240-41 (1965).
131. General Electric, the largest of the violating companies, has entered into settle-
ments with respect to 957 of the sales involved in the suits brought against them. Staff
Study 2. See also note 87 supra.
132. The possibility that the IRS will issue a new ruling, having only a prospective
effect, although unlikely, should not be precluded.
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